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The typology problem and the 
doxastic approach to delusions1




This paper explores one of the most fundamental philosophical worries underlying the oc-
currence of delusions, namely, the problem about the specific type of mental state that 
grounds a delusional report or, as I shall call it, ‘the typology problem’. The analysis is de-
veloped as follows: (i) After formulating and circumscribing the target problem, (ii) I explore 
the main tenets and advantages of the doxastic view of delusions, perhaps, the strongest 
candidate currently available within the typology debate. (iii) After, I clarify and evaluate 
four of the main counter-arguments against the doxastic view offering a number of counter 
replies to these attacks. (iv) Finally, I conclude that the anti-doxastic argumentation offers no 
good reasons to abandon the doxastic model and that this model does not need to appeal 
to external resources to reply to such counter-arguments. At the same time, I finalize with 
some of the challenges that remain open within the doxastic view.
Keywords: psychosis, delusions, doxastic view of delusions, typology problem.
RESUMO
Esse artigo explora uma das preocupações filosóficas mais fundamentais que subjazem 
à manifestação de delírios, a saber, o problema do tipo específico de estado mental que 
fundamenta um relato de delírio - o que chamarei de ‘problema tipológico’. A análise em-
preendida é desenvolvida do seguinte modo: (i) Após formular e circunscrever o proble-
ma-alvo, (ii) exploro os principais comprometimentos e vantagens da explicação doxástica 
dos delírios, que é talvez a mais forte dentre as soluções propostas dentro do debate 
tipológico. (iii) A seguir, esclareço e avalio quatro dos principais argumentos contra a expli-
cação doxástica, oferecendo réplicas a esses ataques. (iv) Finalmente, concluo que a argu-
mentação anti-doxástica não oferece boas razões para abandonarmos o modelo doxástico 
e argumento que esse modelo não precisa apelar a recursos externos para responder aos 
argumentos anti-doxásticos. Termino o artigo expondo alguns desafios ao modelo doxásti-
co que permanecem em aberto.
Palavras-chave: psicose, delírios, visão doxástica de delírios, problema tipológico.
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From clinical observations to 
philosophical worries: The 
complexities of delusion
Delusional cases challenge our most fundamental as-
sumptions about the normal functioning of human mind. Of-
ten, from a clinical point of view, delusions have been usually 
regarded as the hallmark of psychosis, the sign per excellence of 
a broken mind. As Ja ers (1963, p. 93) claims: “since time 
immemorial, delusion has been taken as the basic chara er-
istic of madness. To be mad was to be deluded”. Nowadays, 
delusions are considered a major symptom of a number of 
psychiatric conditions such as schizophrenia and major de-
pression, although they can be also observed in neurological 
medical conditions such as dementia (Coltheart et al., 2011). 
The study of delusions is complex as they are heteroge-
neous in terms of content, scope, aetiology, and phenomeno-
logical features. In terms of content, the delusion that one is 
dead and that one’s internal organs are rotten is clearly bizarre 
for example (Cotard delusion). However, not all delusions are 
bizarre; some of them might be even true in different circum-
stances, these are called ‘mundane’ delusions. Take the case of 
the delusion that my mother is a serial killer. Although this is 
not the case – not that I know of at least – this situation might 
be true if, in fact, my mother has got the atrocious habit of 
killing people3. Now, when patients exhibit a single delusion 
or a small set of delusional states that are all related to a single 
theme, delusions are called monothematic. In the Cotard case, 
the patient holds a  ecific delusional state and although some 
other delusional states might emerge – like the delusional be-
lief of being immortal – they seem to be associated with the 
main delusional belief (being dead). In contrast, if patients 
exhibit delusional states about a variety of topics that are un-
related to each other, delusions are polythematic. For example, 
Capps (2004) comments the case of Josh Nash who believed 
he was the Emperor of Antarctica, the left foot of God on 
Earth, and that his real name was Johann von Nassau, among 
many other delusional beliefs. 
In terms of scope, delusions are circumscribed when they 
do not lead to the formation of other intentional states that 
might be related to the content of the delusion, nor do they 
have important effects in the subject’s behaviour4. Delusions 
are elaborated when the subject reporting it draws conse-
quences from the delusion (often manife ed in  ecific be-
haviours) and forms other beliefs that orbit around the main 
delusions. It is claimed that elaborated delusions can turn 
into complex narratives that might help to make sense of the 
whole delusional situation that the patient is living (Davies et 
al., 2001)5.
Regarding the aetiology of delusional phenomena, a 
basic distinction is usually drawn between motivational and 
deficit approaches (Mckay et al., 2009; López-Silva, 2015). 
The former class claims that the production of delusions is 
motivated by the psychological benefits they confer to the de-
luded subject (see Bentall and Kaney, 1996; Bell, 2003). On 
this view, delusional phenomena are chara erized as a ive 
psychological responses to threatening internal or external 
psychological stimuli, these responses not being necessarily 
linked to any particular type of affective, perceptual, or cogni-
tive deficit or malfunction. Contrasting with the motivational 
formulation, deficit approaches conceptualize delusional phe-
nomena exclusively as the result of different impairments at 
different stages of the process of belief and thought formation 
(McKay and Dennett, 2009). Rather than adaptive psycho-
logical responses, delusions involve disorders and alterations 
in the normal functioning of beliefs produced by a combina-
tion of anomalous first-order perceptual experiences (Maher, 
1974, 2003), impairments in the process of hypothesis evalu-
ation (Langdon and Coltheart, 2000), or unusual experiences 
accompanied by reasoning biases (Garety et al., 2001), among 
many others. 
All these distinctions are source of a number of debates 
within the current clinical community. However, although 
delusions are a crucial clinical phenomenon – given their con-
sequences in human mental health –, when paying closer at-
tention, they also become source of a number of philosophical 
discussions. Over the last years, delusions have attra ed the 
attention of philosophers from different traditions as they pro-
pose a number of questions regarding the most fundamental 
a ects of human mind such as the rules of rationality (Ber-
múdez, 2001; Gerrans, 2002), the intentionality of conscious 
mental states (Berrios, 1991), the nature of self-knowledge 
(Fernández, 2010), the structure of self-awareness (Gallagher, 
2014), and the reality of the self (Bentall, 2003) among many 
others. Certainly, the exploration of delusions is a matter that 
necessarily requires a great deal of cooperation between dif-
3 The bizarreness of a delusion seems to be a matter related to the degree of empirical likelihood of a certain situation or state of affairs.
4 As we will see in section “The anti-doxastic stance: Objections and replies”, this issue represents a current debate within the context 
of the discussion about the nature of delusions.
5 The circumscribed- elaborated distinction seems to be relevant to specify the degree of integration between the delusional state and 
other states of different kind of the subject. Coltheart and Davies (2000) claim that while polythematic delusions tend to be elaborated, 
monothematic delusions tend to be circumscribed. However, it is important to note that the same type of delusion might be circum-
scribed in some cases and elaborated in some others. For instance, a patient with the belief that her left limb is not hers but belongs 
to her mother (somatoparaphrenia) but shows no preoccupation for of her original limb and does not look for it seems to have a cir-
cumscribed delusion. Now, a patient with the same type of delusion (somatoparaphrenia) might show preoccupation and even develop 
paranoid thoughts about the situation. In addition, she might engage in behaviours aimed to find her original limb. In this case, the 
patient would have an elaborated delusion.
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ferent disciplines such as psychopathology, clinical psycholo-
gy, neuropsychiatry, cognitive sciences, and philosophy, just to 
name a few (Fulford et al., 2013; López-Silva, 2014).
Following the interdisciplinary spirit that the study of 
delusions requires, this paper aims at exploring one of the 
most fundamental philosophical worries underlying this 
phenomenon, namely, the problem about the  ecific type of 
mental state that grounds a delusional report or, as I call it, ‘the 
typology problem’. The analysis will be developed as follows: 
(i) After formulating and circumscribing the typology debate, 
(ii) I will explore the main tenets and advantages of the dox-
astic view of delusions, perhaps, the strongest candidate cur-
rently available within our discussion. (iii) After, I will clarify 
and evaluate four of the main counter-arguments against the 
doxastic view and I will offer some counter-replies to these 
attacks. (iv) Finally, I will conclude that the anti-doxastic ar-
gumentation offers no good reasons to abandon the doxastic 
model and that this model does not need to appeal to external 
resources to plausibly deal with such counter-arguments. At 
the same time, I will refer to some of the challenges that re-
main open within the doxastic view.
Mapping the discussion
The definition of delusions
The current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) defines delusions as ‘a 
false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality 
that is held despite what almost everyone else believes and 
despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof 
or evidence to the contrary’ (APA, 2013, p. 819). As we can 
easily observe, this definition is controversial in many ways. 
For example, some delusions might be chara erized as ac-
cidentally true – as in the case of my mother being a serial 
killer – and others might not even be about external reality 
but rather about internal mental or bodily states6. Sometimes, 
even the internal-external distinction becomes obscure as in 
the case of a patient that claimed to be at Boston and Paris at 
the same time (Weinstein and Kahn, 1955) or in cases where 
patients report that some of their thoughts have been stolen 
(Mullins and Spence, 2003). 
Now, as well as there are elements of disagreement sur-
rounding the DSM’s definition of delusions, almost everyone 
would agree that delusions – as a mental symptom – are an 
important source of stress to patients (Van Rossum et al., 
2011; López-Silva, 2015). In this context, some might con-
fuse a certain ‘neutrality’ or lack of affect of certain patients 
towards their delusions when reporting them, however, this 
seems misleading as the important moment to take into ac-
count is when patients are actually ‘having’ their delusions. In 
those moments, delusions are an undeniable source of stress. 
Delusions are usually regarded as ‘pathological’ for many rea-
sons (Campbell, 2001; Frankish, 2009; Gallagher, 2009). A 
basic point to be made here is that, even within motivational 
approaches, delusions emerge as an abnormal way of dealing 
with mental conflicts or deficits (depending on the view from 
within delusions are formulated, see last section). Finally, a 
common view in the philosophy of psychiatry and psycho-
pathology is that they are not biologically adaptive (Zolotova 
and Brüne, 2006). In this sense, the development of delusions 
would not help in any way to increase a subject’s probabilities 
of survival in a  ecific environment McKay and Dennett, 
2009). Finally, it is agreed that delusions are also reported in 
a sincere way even in the affective and behavioural rea ions 
observed in patients are not those that one might expected if 
those report were true (Zahavi, 2005; Bortolotti, 2010).
The typology problem
A key debate underlying the clinical and philosophical 
understanding of delusions is the one concerning the type of 
mental states in which delusional reports are actually ground-
ed. Think about the following cases. When Agustín says he is 
watching Star Wars, we can conclude without further discussion 
or doubt that Agustín’s statement is grounded in a perceptual 
experience. Agustín reports what he reports just because he is 
having a visual experience of that movie. Now, when Nelly says 
she was thinking about what would it be like to be a caveman, 
we can uncontroversially conclude that she was imagining that 
something was the case. Nelly’s report is based on an imagina-
tive-cognitive experience of a certain kind. However, what can 
we say in cases where a subject asserts that she is dead (Cotard 
delusion; Berrios and Luque, 1995), her bodily movements are 
under control of aliens (Delusions of alien control; Firth, 1992), 
or when she says she an external agent is inserting thoughts into 
her mind (Mullins and Spence, 2003)? Independent from  e-
cific theoretical frameworks, all these cases are usually regarded 
as delusions, but what types of mental state are these patients 
reporting? Are delusional reports grounded in actual percep-
tual states? Does this make them perceptual states? Are they 
just the product of unmonitored imaginative a ivity that ends 
up deceiving the subject? Let’s call this the typology problem, 
namely, the problem about the  ecific type of mental state that 
grounds delusional reports.
Why is the typology problem a problem at all? The an-
swer to this question seems to have two dimensions. First, the 
typology problem is a problem from a clinical point of view. 
Clinicians aim not only at identifying pathological mental 
phenomena, but also, at building up explanatory theories and 
therapeutic treatments. Without a clear idea about the type of 
6 Take the case of Cotard delusion that involves the delusional belief that one is dead (McKay and Cicopolotti, 2007). Such delusional 
belief is not about external reality – as in the case of Capgras delusion for example - but rather about internal states of the subject.
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mental state a delusion is, it is hard to see how clinicians might 
be able to offer  ecific explanatory theories, as these theories 
would necessarily take the form of explanatory frameworks 
about  ecific mental states and their disruptions (Coltheart, 
2015). In the same way, it is hard to see how one might build 
 ecific therapeutic technics without having clear clues about 
the type of mental state one is dealing with. Second, the typol-
ogy problem is a philosophical problem as it leads to a number 
of debates about our most fundamental ideas about human 
rationality, the nature of phenomenal consciousness, the na-
ture of intentionality, and other key issues within the philoso-
phy of mind. Certainly, a clarification of the typology debate 
might not only contribute to the development of conceptual 
fields such as philosophy but also, to applied fields such as psy-
chiatry, clinical psychology, and psychopathology.
A potential solution? 
The doxastic approach to 
delusions and its appeal
One of the strongest solutions to the typology problem 
currently available in the literature is the so-called doxa ic 
approach to delusions. This view takes its name from ‘doxa’, 
Greek word for belief or opinion, and its main tenet is that 
delusions are better understood as a type of belief (Bayne and 
Pacherie, 2005; Bortolotti, 2010, 2012; Bayne and Hattianga-
di, 2013)7. Contrasting with other views on the same problem, 
here, beliefs are broadly understood as propositional attitudes8. 
More  ecifically, most advocates of the doxastic view tend 
to endorse McKay and Dennett’s notion of belief as “mental 
states of a subject that implement or embody that subject’s 
endorsement of a particular internal or external state of af-
fairs as actual” (2009, p. 493). Of course, it is important to 
note that within the doxastic approach, beliefs are not just a 
type of belief; they are an abnormal type of belief, or, in words 
of McKay and Dennett (2009), they are misbeliefs. 
Two main doxastic expressions can be identified in the 
literature. On the one hand, top-down views suggest that 
delusional doxastic frameworks might influence the phe-
nomenal chara er of experiences and a ions (Campbell, 
2001). On this view, abnormal doxastic states would act as 
an intelligibility framework for certain experience in a way 
that such frameworks would penetrate the subjective features 
of experiences. On the other hand, bottom-up views suggest 
that ‘the proximal cause of the delusional belief is a certain 
highly unusual experience’ (Bayne and Pacherie, 2004, p. 2). 
On this view, certain abnormal experiences would propose 
highly implausible doxastic hypothesis that would be accept-
ed by a cognitive system as a result of a number of deficits in 
the process of evaluating that type of information (McKay et 
al., 2009). As we can see, these two doxastic expressions differ 
when trying to set up the causal direction in the relationship 
between experience and belief. Within bottom-up approach-
es the causal relation goes from experience to belief (Maher, 
1974, 2003; Coltheart, 2015), whilst in top-down approaches 
it goes from belief to experience (Campbell, 2001). This dis-
tinction is important, as it will be part of the main challenges 
that remain open within the doxastic approach. However, it is 
not my job to decide which one of these doxastic expressions 
is better here.
The doxastic view enjoys a well-deserved popularity 
within current philosophy of mind and neuropsychiatry. This 
can be easily explained by the empirical and conceptual ad-
vantages that this view offers over its main rivals. Now, let me 
explore some of these main advantages:
Diagnostic Evidence: It has been noted that delusions are 
usually reported as beliefs by patients (Bortolotti and Miya-
zono, 2014). Generally, when asked whether they really be-
lieve what they report within a psychotherapeutic setting, 
delusional patients claim that they really do so (Bisiah and 
Gemianini, 1991). For example, when asked if he really be-
lieved what he was reporting, one of my patients exclaimed 
“what do you mean? Of course! I’m not inventing it!”9. This 
type of reply and the high degree of subjective certainty com-
monly associated with delusional reports offer would be nice-
ly explained by the doxastic view of delusions. 
Subjective Certainty: Delusions are usually reported with 
a considerable degree of subjective certainty. This issue can be 
plausibly explained if we conclude that delusions are beliefs 
because high degrees of subjective certainty seem to be char-
a eristic of beliefs (Langdon and Bayne, 2010). However, it is 
important to note that the degree of subjective certainty with 
which delusions are reported varies considerably from subject 
to subject (Parnas, 2003). 
7 The fundamental rationale behind the doxastic approach finds its roots in Locke’s notion of madness. In his Essay on Human Under-
standing, Locke (1961) suggests that madness was due to faulty associations in the process whereby sense data (experiential inputs) 
were transformed into ‘ideas’ (beliefs) (for a contemporary version of this idea, see Maher (1974). Porter (2003, p. 127) claims that 
Locke’s notion of madness as the result of different impairments in the process of formation of ideas became central to the new thinking 
about mental conditions in Britain and France around 1700. In fact, the term ‘delusion’ was first used as referring to mental problems 
around the same date.
8 Roughly speaking, a proposition is whatever a declarative sentence expresses. A propositional attitude is the mental state of having a 
certain attitude or stance towards a certain proposition. Hoping, desiring, wanting, and believing are different instances of propositional 
attitudes, among many others.
9 R was a schizophrenic patient who, among other symptoms, had the delusional belief of being able to have conversations with Elvis 
Presley every morning. He said that Elvis came every morning to the psychiatric hospital to have a chat with him. Along with this belief, 
the patient also claimed that he was in a relationship with Maura Rivera, dancer from a popular Chilean TV show at that time.
Pablo López-Silva
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 17(2):202-211, may/aug 2016 206
Discriminative Power and Conceptual Clarity: the doxastic 
view offers a conceptually and phenomenologically appeal-
ing way to distinguish delusions from other types of psycho-
pathological mental states. While delusions reflect distur-
bances in the process of formation of beliefs, hallucinations, 
for instance, might reflect disturbances related to perceptual 
processes (Langdon and Bayne, 2010). Indeed, this ability is 
always desirable for it allows clinicians to develop a more  e-
cific diagnostic, which in turn might guide better-defined and 
more  ecific treatments in psychotherapeutic contexts. This 
conceptual clarity is highly desirable when trying to develop 
empirical research on delusions.
Pathological Nature of Delusions: The doxastic approach 
to delusions explains nicely the pathological nature of delu-
sions. As Bortolotti and Miyazono (2014, p. 32) suggest:
LA-O’s mental condition is pathological 
partly because she seriously denies that her 
left hand belongs to her. If she did not be-
lieve it, but merely imagined it, there would 
not be anything particularly pathological 
about her condition, as acts of imagination 
do not necessarily reflect how things are for 
the person engaging in the imagining. It is a 
strange thing for LA-O to imagine that her 
left hand does not belong to her, but we 
can easily entertain various kinds of strange 
possibilities in our imagination without los-
ing mental health.
Strong Research Framework: the doxastic approach pro-
vides a robust conceptual framework to guide empirical re-
search on delusions (Coltheart and Davies, 2000; Coltheart, 
2015). Once we accept delusions are beliefs, psychiatrists and 
philosophers would only need to focus on the way human be-
ings come to form beliefs and understand the different alter-
ations of these mechanisms that give raise to delusions (Col-
theart, 2015). Naturally, here the challenge is to explore and 
comprehend such mechanisms in the adequate ways. A num-
ber of researchers in current neuropsychiatry have endorsed 
this the doxastic approach to delusions and claim that in or-
der to understand delusions, philosophers and pra itioners 
should have a closer look at the different perceptual and cog-
nitive mechanisms involved in the process of production of 
beliefs (Maher, 1974; Coltheart, 2002, 2009). The thought 
here is that by understanding how these mechanisms break 
down under certain circumstances, we might be able to deci-
pher the psychogenesis of delusions (Coltheart, 2005, 2015). 
Explanatory Power: empirically well-supported doxas-
tic accounts have been formulated for a wide range of delu-
sions, such as, persecutory delusions (Freeman et al., 2002), 
delusions of alien control (Frith, 1992), delusions of thought 
insertion (Frith, 1992; Martin and Pacherie, 2013), Capgras 
delusions (Ellis and Young, 1990), Fregoli delusion (Ram-
achandran and Blakeslee, 1998), Cotard delusions (Ramach-
andran and Blakeslee, 1998), Somatoparaphrenia (Bisiach 
and Geminiani, 1991), and mirrored-self misidentification 
(Davies et al., 2001), among many others.
The anti-doxastic stance: 
Objections and replies
Despite all the aforementioned advantages, over the last 
years a number of authors have argued that the doxastic ap-
proach fails to make sense of delusions in a plausible way. The 
anti-doxastic stance can be divided into two main a ects: a 
negative and a positive one. Whilst the negative a ect refers 
to the reasons offered by the anti-doxastic to believe that de-
lusions are not beliefs and abandon a doxastic stance, the pos-
itive a ect refers to the alternative answers that advocates of 
anti-doxasticism would offer to the typology problem10. Now, 
the main focus of the negative dimension of the anti-doxas-
tic stance has been the idea that delusions would fail to in-
stantiate the main features of paradigmatic beliefs and that 
therefore, delusions should not be understood as beliefs. In 
this section, I evaluate these anti-doxastic arguments and I 
offer counter-replies to these attacks. As I will stress in the 
conclusions section, as it stands, the doxastic approach seems 
to be in a good position to deal with these counter-arguments 
without appealing to external argumentative elements. 
The argument about subjective certainty
The first attack to the doxastic view of delusions con-
cerns the subjective features that would chara erize delu-
sional reports. The argument about subjectivity certainty 
would run something like this:
(1)  Beliefs are consistently reported with high degrees 
of subjective certainty
(2)  Delusions are reported with variable degrees of sub-
jective certainty.
        
(C) Delusions are not beliefs because they do not posses the 
degree of subjective certainty that paradigmatic beliefs posses.
This argument rests on the idea that normal beliefs are 
reported with high and invariable degrees of subjective cer-
tainty. In contrast, delusions would be reported with vari-
10 It has been suggested that delusions might be better characterized as cognitive imaginings, i.e. imaginative states that are misiden-
tified by the subjects as beliefs (Currie, 2000; Currie and Jureidini, 2001). Hohwy and colleagues argue that delusions should be under-
stood as the result of perceptual inferences (Hohwy and Rosenberg, 2005; Hohwy and Rajan, 2012). Egan (2009) claims that delusions 
are bimaginations, i.e. states with some belief-like and imagination-like features, and Schwitzbegel (2012) finally concludes that we 
should think of delusions as neither beliefs nor non-beliefs, but rather, as in-between beliefs.
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able degrees of certainty. For example, De Hann and De 
Bruin (2010) claim that, in some cases, patients report their 
delusional episodes ‘as if ’ they were the case: “it is as if my 
girlfriend can read my thoughts […] it is as if I am from an-
other planet” (p. 385, note 16). This fluctuation in subjective 
certainty would not be present in paradigmatic beliefs so it 
would give the anti-doxastic a reason to suggest that delusions 
do not instantiate the expected features of beliefs and there-
fore, that we should not chara erize them as such.
There are a number of ways in which the doxastic advo-
cate might reply to this attack. The main problem seems to be 
that plausibility of premise (1) as it imposes a too demanding 
requirement, in fact, a requirement that cannot be even met 
by normal beliefs. The truth is that even normal beliefs are re-
ported with variable degrees of subjective certainty. Beliefs are 
not a static mental state, they are highly context-dependent, 
flexible, and fluctuating (Bayne and Hattiangadi, 2013). I can 
report a certain normal belief with variable degrees of sub-
jective certainty depending on a number of internal (mood, 
affective processing, cognitive conditions, etc.) and external 
(social role,  ecific task in which it emerges, etc.) elements. 
Given the contextual nature of beliefs, all the elements might 
influence their degrees of subjective certainty. Take the case 
of P believing in G: God. The degree of subjective certainty 
with which P reports G might vary depending on the situ-
ation in which the belief is reported. Perhaps, after reading 
Nietzsche, P seems to believe in G but P’s not quite sure about 
it. P’s belief that G seems to show a low degree of subjective 
certainty in this situation. Now, P might report that G with 
high degrees of subjective certainty right after having experi-
enced a massive earthquake. Arguably, P’s doubts about God’s 
existence do not show that P does not believe in G, but rath-
er, that P has got a certain belief and some reasons to doubt 
about it. For many beliefs, it seems uncontroversial to say that 
one can have them while nurturing doubts about them. In 
that case, such doubts are just the product of the exercise of 
one’s rational abilities. Therefore, it seems plausible to say that 
variable degrees of subjective certainty also chara erize re-
ports of normal beliefs and that one should rule out a doxastic 
stance towards delusions on this basis.
Another option available for the doxastic defender is to 
say that it is perfectly possible for a single cognitive system 
to have contradictory beliefs (which is quite different from 
holding a single belief with contradictory content of the type 
<P ∧ ~P>). According to Davidson (1982), a subject can have 
two mutually contradictory beliefs, as long he does not believe 
their conjunction at the same time i.e. <P ∧ ~P>. Regardless of 
the argumentative power of this last argument, here the main 
issue at hand is that the phenomenon of subjective certainty 
should be understood as a matter of degree. One should not 
think about this issue as a black-or-white phenomenon, but 
rather, as a continuum in which different degrees of subjec-
tive certainty can be located depending on the external and 
internal elements that accompany the emergence of such 
states. While one pole of this continuum might be associated 
with lower degrees of subjective certainty as those chara er-
izes imaginative and dream-like states, the other pole would 
be related to states showing higher degrees of subjective cer-
tainty as those chara erizing normal beliefs. Thus, although 
the degree of certainty in asserting the content of certain de-
lusions can vary, this degree of certainty would not be compa-
rable with those of imaginings, for example, where subjective 
certainty seems low or even non-existent. The truth is that, 
in most cases, delusional patients assert the content of their 
delusions with high degrees of subjective certainty at different 
stages of their aetiological development, and given that vari-
ability (within the higher-pole of this continuum), is present 
even in normal beliefs, delusions might be nicely explained by 
the doxastic model.
The argument about responsiveness
The second anti-doxastic argument concerns the way in 
which delusions respond to counter-evidence. This argument 
runs something like this:
(1) Beliefs are responsive to counter-evidence.
(2) Delusions are not responsive to counter-evidence.
         
(C) Delusions are not beliefs because beliefs are respon-
sive to counter-evidence and delusions are not.
The idea behind this argument is that M is a belief of the 
subject if and only if M is responsive to evidence. Thus, delu-
sions fail to meet this requirement and therefore, they should 
not be understood as beliefs of any kind. The first point to be 
made is that it is just not true that delusions are never respon-
sive to counter evidence. As Schreber observes in his Mem-
oirs of My Nervous Illness, “what objectively are delusions and 
hallucinations are to him [the patient] unassailable truth and 
adequate motive for a ion” (1988, p. 282, my emphasis). 
A second reply emerges from a more pra ical point 
of view. Take the case of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
(CBT), perhaps the most popular approach to the treatment 
of delusions. This approach is premised in the idea that de-
lusions are a type of belief (Alford and Beck, 1994). One of 
the main technics of CBT consists in questioning the pa-
tient’s delusional belief in light of counterevidence (Dicker-
son, 2000). CBT has been proven effective in the treatment 
of some delusions and such effectiveness can be accounted 
by the fact that delusions are sometimes responsive to coun-
terevidence (Garety et al., 1997)11. In this context, the truth 
is that delusions are sometimes responsive to evidence while 
other times they are not. 
11 In fact, a great portion of the therapeutic work in the treatment of delusions can be explained by the fact that delusions are sometimes 
responsive to counterevidence.
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A final reply to the responsiveness objection is that the ar-
gument is based on the idea that paradigmatic beliefs are nec-
essarily rational in virtue of their responsiveness to evidence. 
However, this idea seems to be way too demanding for it has 
been shown that, sometimes, not even ordinary beliefs are en-
tirely responsive to counterevidence (Nisbett and Ross, 1980; 
Bentall, 2003; Bortolotti, 2010). Clear examples of ordinary 
beliefs lacking the degree of responsiveness to evidence sup-
posedly chara eristic of paradigmatic beliefs are racist and 
sexist beliefs. A male sexist subject might have the belief that 
being a woman is enough for that subject to be considered as 
inferior in many ways. Sexist beliefs are the result of a num-
ber of biases, and they lack the degree of responsiveness to 
evidence that paradigmatic beliefs exhibit; however, they are 
not denied the belief status. The problem with this objection 
is that some of our ordinary beliefs are irrational in the same 
way delusions can be and therefore, again, the objection e ab-
lishes a requirement that not even some ordinary (non-delu-
sional) beliefs meet. Nonetheless, it is important to note that 
the main difference between delusional and non-responsive 
ordinary beliefs seems to be given by the degree of responsive-
ness. Irrational ordinary beliefs seem to be more responsive 
to evidence than delusional beliefs and the challenge for the 
advocate of the doxastic approach is to account for this dif-
ference12. The argument seems to take responsiveness as an 
all-or-nothing phenomenon, idea that is far from plausible. 
Different beliefs can be responsive to counter-evidence in dif-
ferent degrees depending on the quality of the information, 
the subject’s personal cognitive patterns, the subject’s current 
affective situation, social context, and on the psychological 
role that the relevant belief plays in the subject’s mind, and 
the same seems to apply to delusions if understood as beliefs.
The argument about doxastic integration
(1) Beliefs are integrated with other beliefs of the subject
(2)  Delusions are not integrated with other beliefs of 
the subject
         
(C) Delusions are not beliefs because beliefs are integrat-
ed with other beliefs of the subject delusions are not.
The idea behind this argument is that M is a belief of 
the subject if and only if M is integrated with other beliefs 
of the subject. Thus, delusions fail to meet this requirement 
and therefore, they should not be understood as beliefs of any 
kind. Currie and Jureidini (2001, p. 161) conclude that de-
lusions “[fail], sometimes  ectacularly, to be integrated with 
what the subject really does believe”. 
First, it is important to note that it is not clear how Cur-
rie and Jureidini are in position to know what the patient 
really believe. If we take delusional reports at face value and 
consider the way in which patients report their delusional 
episodes, one might be able to say without much discussion 
that they do believe that aliens are controlling their bodily 
movements, that they are dead, that machines insert thought 
into their mind, and so on. The problem here is that delusion-
al beliefs seem not to be integrated with some other beliefs of 
the subject. However, in this context we can ask two simple 
questions: The first is (i) do delusions really fail to be integrat-
ed with other beliefs of the subject? The answer seems to be 
‘not always’. In many cases, delusions are integrated well with 
other beliefs of the subject (Bortolotti, 2010). Prima facie, the 
patient that planned to remove one of his two heads with an 
axe was able to integrate his ‘perceptual delusional bicephaly’ 
with the belief with the content <I can use an axe to remove 
my second head> (see Ames, 1984). The second question to 
ask here is (ii) are paradigmatic beliefs always integrated be-
tween each other? The answer seems to be, again, ‘not always’. 
The main problem with this objection is that the failure of 
delusions to be integrated with some other beliefs of the sub-
ject is exaggerated and therefore, it imposes a requirement 
that not even ordinary beliefs meet. However, as Bortolotti 
(2010) claims, it is necessary to note that delusions are evi-
dently less integrated than ordinary beliefs so they show the 
mark of irrationality (bad integration) to a higher degree than 
non-delusional beliefs. Although this is a phenomenon that 
the advocate of the doxastic view should be able to explain, it 
is by no means a good argument to deny the status of belief 
to delusions.
The argument about action guidance
(1)  Beliefs guide  ecific a ions of the subjects that 
hold them.
(2)  Delusions do not guide  ecific a ions of the sub-
jects that hold them
             
(C) Delusions are not beliefs because beliefs guide ac-
tions of the subjects that hold them and delusions do not.
The idea behind this argument is simple, M is a belief of 
the subject if and only if M guide a ions of the subject holding 
M. Thus, delusions fail to meet this requirement and therefore, 
they should not be understood as beliefs of any kind.
This seems to be one of the weakest arguments against 
the doxastic approach for it looks like a great number of de-
luded patients do act on their delusional beliefs (de Pauw 
and Szulecka, 1988). Blount (1986) reports a case of a pa-
tient suffering from Capgras delusion that decapitated his 
stepfather trying to find the batteries in his head. Certain-
ty, the a ion of decapitation was guided by the belief that 
12 It is interesting to note that many delusional cases seem to be an exacerbation of the content of some ordinary (but not originally 
delusional) subjective themes. This seems to be case of jealousy and morbid jealousy, functional obsessive thought of contamination and 
parasitosis, just to name a few. Prima facie, these cases offer another reason to believe in doxasticism about delusions.
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the patient’s stepfather was some kind of machine. Sim-
ilarly, Young and Leafhead (1996) showed that all Cotard 
patients showed some form of delusion-related behaviour. 
In fact, after planning to remove his second head with an 
axe, the aforementioned patient with perceptual delusional 
bicephaly decided to remove it with a gun leading this to a 
number of injuries (see Ames, 1984). A number of patients 
with delusions of superhuman strength have been reported 
injured after a ing on their delusions (Petersen and Still-
man, 1978). These cases show that, sometimes, delusions do 
guide a ions in deluded patients. 
Now, for the sake of the discussion, let me proposed 
a refined version of this objection. This version might pro-
pose that delusions fail to produce the right kind of a ion and 
emotional response that patients are expected to produced if 
delusions were beliefs. For instance, it is claimed that some 
patients suffering from the Capgras Delusion, who claim to 
have beliefs with the content <my wife is an imposter>, fail 
to react in the way we would expect if their delusions were 
actual beliefs. However, there are some basic difficulties with 
this new version of the argument.
First, one cannot expect psychotic patients to react or 
show the same type of rea ive behaviours that non-psychotic 
people commonly exhibit. This is to ignore a number of cog-
nitive, affective, and motivational impairments that patients 
suffer and that might influence the way they react to certain 
mental state such as their own delusions (Fuchs, 2005). Sec-
ond, having a certain belief is different from the behaviour 
derived from it. It has been shown that schizophrenic patients 
tend to have problems with intro ection and general prob-
lems with identifying their own mental states (Taylor et al., 
1997). Parnas and Sass (2003) conclude that schizophrenic 
patients usually show a condition called ‘hyperreflexivity’, 
i.e. an exacerbated explicit awareness of otherwise tacit ele-
ments that usually remains in the background of conscious-
ness. Arguably, one might say that hyperreflexivity arises in 
the context of an informational surplus in consciousness that 
does not allow the patients to behave in the way that it is ex-
pected when having a certain clear and well-identified belief. 
Third, the argument seems to assume that we always act con-
sistently with our beliefs but do we always behave consistently 
with our beliefs? Is it ‘expected behaviour’ a good parameter 
to distinguish between those states that are beliefs and those 
that are not? It seems that we do not always act consistently 
with the beliefs we hold. One can have the belief that there is 
a helper God that looks after his sons while a ing as though 
there is no God. However, the status of belief is not denied to 
the belief in God, even if the subject holding it acts like there 
is no God.
Until this point, the reader might be able to realize that 
most of the anti-doxastic argumentation seems to rely on an 
idealization of the features of normal beliefs, imposing con-
straints on delusional phenomena that not even ordinary 
beliefs would meet. Therefore, there seems not to exist suffi-
ciently compelling reasons to reject the doxastic approach, at 
least, on the basis of the four arguments analysed here.
Concluding remarks: The 
challenges of the doxastic 
approach
Over the last years, the doxastic approach to delusions 
has become a strong candidate in the context of the typology 
problem i.e. the problem about the type of mental state that 
delusional reports instantiate. However, this approach has not 
been free from attacks. Taking into consideration the analysis 
offered here, it seems reasonable to say that the counter argu-
ments against the doxastic stance offer no sufficient reasons 
to reject it. If we are to reject such a view, it is not in virtue of 
the four arguments analysed in section 4 which are the most 
popular in current literature. Think about this issue in this 
way: the mere fact that delusions fail to perform some of the 
roles typically associated with paradigmatic beliefs is not suf-
ficient reason to say that they are not beliefs at all (Reimer, 
2010). Such a conclusion seems too hasty. One might say that 
they are not paradigmatic beliefs – just as the doxastic view 
suggests – or as McKay and Dennett (2009, p. 493) suggest, 
that they are misbeliefs, namely, beliefs that are not correct 
in all particulars. Metaphorically  eaking, the fact that pen-
guins cannot fly does not entail that penguins are not birds 
at all, rather, they are just birds that cannot fly. In the same 
way, the fact that delusions fail to instantiate certain features 
of paradigmatic beliefs in the same degree that they do does 
not entail the fact the delusions are not beliefs, but rather, that 
delusions are just abnormal beliefs. Strictly  eaking, if we de-
fine a belief simply as a mental state of a subject that imple-
ments or embodies that subject’s endorsement of a particular 
internal or external state of affairs as actual (see McKay and 
Dennett, 2009, p. 493), delusions can clearly count as an ab-
normal type of belief. 
However, at this point it is important to note that al-
though the anti-doxastic stance does not seem very success-
ful, the doxastic model of delusions still faces a number of 
conceptual and empirical challenges. The doxastic view needs 
to refresh its main tenets taking into consideration a broader 
and more complete definition of belief and what beliefs im-
ply in relation to other mental states of a single subject. The 
model needs to  ecify a contextualized definition of belief 
that takes into account their flexible, context-dependent, and 
fluctuating nature. In addition, the model needs to clarify the 
issue about the continuum of subjective certainty and the 
way in which external and internal factors might influence 
the way in which beliefs are rea ive to counter-evidence. In 
this sense, such a definition needed involves the clarification 
of the role that beliefs play in a cognitive system’s relationship 
with its environment and itself and not only the definition of 
the issue in isolation. Only by  ecifying all these a ects of a 
refreshed definition of delusions, the doxastic model will be 
able to keep informing good-quality empirical models and, in 
turn, the empirical understanding and therapeutic treatment 
of delusions. Of course, this is a task I cannot undergo here.
Pablo López-Silva
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